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WEST VIRGINIA
HABITUAL CRIMINAL LAW"
LoNDo H. BRoW-N**
Theory of Habitual Criminal Laws
A N HA3rrUAL CaunMAL is a person who makes a habit of commit-
ting crimes, and under the laws of West Virginia the second
commission of a felony, if both result in convictions, is sufficient to
be considered a habit.' Habitual criminal laws impose an additional
penalty in case of a certain number of convictions. There are some
such laws in connection with misdemeanors, but this study is con-
fined to a consideration of habitual criminal laws dealing with
felonies.
The theory of these laws is that the oftener one commits crimes,
the more a menace to society he becomes and the longer he should
be removed from society for its protection.
There is very little motive for reform behind habitual criminal
laws. They are strictly for the purpose of punishing the offender
and to keep him separated from society for a longer time than first
offenders. However, parole laws cut across such laws to a certain
extent in most states today so that there is some incentive for reform
on the part of habitual criminals.
The element of punishment was really present in one of the
earliest habitual criminal laws in this country. The following law
was in force in the early history of our mother state, Virginia. For
the first offense of hog stealing the convicted person was to be
whipped and had to pay two hundred pounds of tobacco to the
owner of the hog and two hundred pounds to the person informing
against him. The statute further provided:
"And if any person or persons, shall for the second time
offend, by stealing any hog, shoat, or pig, he or she so offending,
and being thereof the second time convicted, shall stand two
* This article is the result of a study made by the author for the Joint
Committee on Government and Finance and the Commission on Interstate
Cooperation of the West Virginia Legislature.
** Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
'IW. VA. CoDE c. 61, art. 11, § 18 (Michie 1955).
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HABITUAL CRIMINAL LAW
hours in the pillory, on a court day, and have both ears nailed
thereto, and at the end of said two hours, have the ears cut
loose from the nails."2
Upon a third conviction of hog stealing the statute provided for a
death penalty.3
The element of punishment is present today in all habitual
criminal laws in the form of an additional sentence, but it is still
present in some in the form of physical punishment. In Delaware,
a person convicted of robbery for the first time is punished by
confinement in prison for not less than three nor more than 25 years
and may be whipped with forty lashes, but upon second conviction
of robbery the 40 lashes is mandatory.4 Protection of society is also
present in the habitual criminal laws of some states which provide
that a person who has been convicted of a certain number of felonies
can be sterilized. Delaware has such a law."
The older habitual criminal laws were more severe than those
enacted later. Most older laws, like West Virginia's, were mandatory,
that is, the court has to impose the penalty once the fact of prior
convictions was established, while most of those enacted later were
made discretionary, that is, the court has the power to impose the
penalty or not to impose it in such case.
Several of the older laws have been made more lenient by
amendment in the last 25 years. For example, in Michigan, prior
to 1949, the court had to sentence a person who had been convicted
of a second felony to a term not less than one-half the longest term,
nor more than one and one-half the longest term, to which he could
be sentenced for the present offense, or a minimum of five years,
depending upon the present offense. There was a similar, but more
severe, type additional penalty for third and fourth offenses. 6 In
1949 the minimum additional sentences were deleted and the court
could impose the former maximum additional penalty or a lesser
term in its discretion.7
23 LAws oF VIRGInIA 276 (Hening, 1823).
3id. at 278.
4 DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 811 (1953).
5 Id. § 5703. Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah and Washington
are listed as having such laws. See Brown, The Treatment of Recidivism in
the United States, 23 CAN. B. REv. 640 (1945).
6 See MicH. CoM. LAws § § 769.10-12 (1948).
7 See Mich. Acts 1949, No. 56.
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Kansas did have an act similar to West Virginia's present act
in that a life sentence was mandatory in case of a third felony con-
viction. This part of the law was left out of a new habitual criminal
law enacted in 1939 after the old law was repealed in 1937. The
Kansas law now provides for a mandatory doubled term upon a sec-
ond felony conviction and not less than 15 years upon a third con-
viction.8  This change followed a study of the Kansas habitual
criminal law by the Kansas Legislative Council in 1936,9 which
resulted in a report that the law was too severe. The report showed
that while 41.3% of the persons committed to Kansas prison over a
seven year period were repeat offenders, and so were subject to
the imposition of the habitual criminal law, only 9.5% were com-
mitted under that law.
Since the old Kansas law was like our present law and since
the Kansas law was made more lenient, I wrote Kansas officials
asking how many of the persons committed to Kansas prisons in the
seven year period following 1939 had prior felony convictions, and
how many were committed under the present habitual criminal law.
The response from the Warden of Kansas State Penitentiary con-
tained the following paragraph:
"From the 1st of January, 1940, up to and including the end
of December, 1947, a total of 925 prisoners had prior convic-
tions, and thus were eligible to be sentenced under the Habitual
Criminal Act. Of this number, 146 were thus sentenced."
So, under the more lenient law, only about 15.7% of those sub-
ject to the law were sentenced under it over an eight year period
in spite of the fact that the law made it mandatory that it be imposed
in every case where it was applicable.
Forty-five states, the District of Columbia and Alaska, now have
some type of habitual criminal law. Only the three southern states
of Maryland, Mississippi and North Carolina have no such laws.
However, one of these states, Mississippi, provides in its parole law
that no prisoner whose record shows him to be a confirmed and
habitual criminal or who has been three times convicted of a felony
shall be eligible for parole.'0
8 KEN. GEN. STATS § 21-107a (1949).
9 See Tappan, Habitual Offender Laws in the United States, 13 FED.
PROBAnTION 28 (1949). This article also states that Louisiana, New York and
Oregon have modified the severity of their habitual criminal laws.
10 See Miss. CODE § 4004.03 (Supp. 1954).
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While many of these laws are very old (West Virginia's having
been carried over from Virginia), Delaware enacted its first real ha-
bitual criminal law in 1953,11 and South Carolina enacted its first
such law in 1955.12
Constitutionality
The habitual criminal laws of the various states have been
attacked on the grounds that they violate the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitutions of the United States
and of the states, that they are ex post facto laws and that they place
the person against whom they are sought to be imposed in double
jeopardy.
These laws have generally been held constitutional, and the
case of State v. Graham,'3 in which the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia held West Virginia's habitual criminal law to be
constitutional, which decision was affrmed by the United States
Supreme Court, is one of the most cited cases on this issue. In that
case our Supreme Court stated,
"Since the imposing of the additional sentence warranted by
law is not holding to answer for a crime, is not a second jeopardy
or punishment for the offense itself to which the sentence
rightfully belongs, and is clearly due process of law, what consti-
tutional limitation has been placed upon the legislature in this
particular? None."14
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court on
appeal, that court quoted the West Virginia court when it stated,
"The proceedings under the statute are for identification only.
They are clearly not for the establishment of guilt. The ques-
tion of guilt is not reopened."15
Types of Habitual Criminal Laws
The laws of the various jurisdictions in regard to habitual crimi-
nals vary to a great extent, yet many have several features in com-
mon. A majority of them provide for a life sentence upon a third
11 DE.. CODE tit 11, § 3911 (Supp. 1954.)
12 S.C. Acts 1955, No. 131.
13 68 W. Va. 248, 69 S.E. 1010, aft'd, 224 U.S. 616 (1910).
14 68 W. Va. at 253, 69 S.E. at 1011.
15 224 U.S. at 624.
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or fourth felony conviction; seven for a third conviction,'0 and 19
for a fourth conviction. 17 One provides for a maximum of life on a
fourth conviction.' 8 Some do not provide for a life sentence for
any number of convictions. They provide only for an increased
penalty for second or third convictions or for repeat offenders.
Examples of such laws are: Illinois law makes the maximum sen-
tence mandatory for second offenders and a minimum of 15 years
mandatory for third offenders. 19 Kansas law provides that a doubled
sentence upon a second felony conviction and a period of not less
than 15 years upon a third such conviction are mandatory. 20 Ar-
kansas law provides that a graduated increase in the minimum term,
according to the number of former convictions is mandatory for
repeat offenders. 21 This is supplemented by a statute which denies
release from prison until the expiration of the minimum sentence.22
Mississippi, which has no habitual criminal law, gives an additional
sentence to repeat offenders in effect by denying parole to persons
convicted three times of felonies.2a
Practically all jurisdictions which provide for a life sentence
upon a third or fourth felony conviction also provide for increased
penalties upon second or third convictions. Exceptions are Dela-
ware, Tennessee and Vermont which provide only for a life sentence
upon a fourth conviction.
Only five states restrict the application of their habitual crimi-
nal laws to specifically enumerated crimes. 24 The recently enacted
South Carolina statute and the Illinois and Pennsylvania statutes are
examples of this type habitual criminal law.25 Most such statutes
apply to any felony or, like West Virginia's, any offense punishable
by imprisonment in a penitentiary.
16 California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Texas, Washington and West
Virginia.
17Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont and Wyoming.
Is New York.
19 ILL. REV. STATS. c. 88, § 602 (1955).
2 0 KAN. STATS. c. 21, § 107a (1949).
2 1 ARK. STATS. tit. 43, §§ 2328, 2329 (Supp. 1955).
22 Id. § 2307.
23 MIsS. CODE § 4004.03 (Supp. 1954).
24 ILLINOIs LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HABrruAL CnmbNAI. STATUTEs (Publica-
tion 122, 1955).
25 See notes 12 and 19 supra, and 27 infra.
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Thirty-four of such laws make the prescribed punishment man-
datory and thirteen leave the imposition of the additional penalty
to the courts' discretion. The American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code makes the additional penalty discretionary.26
Very few habitual criminal laws provide that the subsequent
offense must be committed within a certain time from the previous
conviction. Thus, under several such laws, a person could be con-
victed of two offenses while he is under 25 years of age, live a law
abiding life for 25 years, and then commit another felony and be
adjudged an habitual criminal and sentenced to prison for life. How-
ever, the law of our neighbor state, Pennsylvania, provides that the
subsequent felony must be committed within five years after the
previous offense, or within five years from the time the person is
released from prison if he was imprisoned for the prior offense, be-
fore the additional penalty can be imposed 2 7  Wisconsin has a
similar law.28
If the habitual criminal law is discretionary, such a provision
is probably not necessary as very few judges or courts would impose
an additional penalty if there were a mitigating circumstance such
as a long period of good behavior between convictions. This is also
probably true in jurisdictions like West Virginia where the law is
mandatory in theory, but discretionary in practice, which feature of
West Virginia's law will be referred to again in this report.
A more important time element in these laws is whether the
convictions must be separated for a certain time; that is, whether
a person must have had a time for reform between one conviction
and the commission of a subsequent felony. Many statutes so pro-
vide and, while West Virginia's does not, the question was settled
in a case where our court held that two convictions at one term of
court could not be counted as two offenses under our habitual crimi-
nal law, because there must be a time for reform between convic-
tions in such case.2 9
An element of habitual criminal laws which has often been
criticized is the fact that many such laws require the person to be
indicted as an habitual criminal before the law can be imposed. The
26 MoDE_ PENAL CODE § 7.03 (Ten. Draft No. 2, 1954).
2TPA. STATS. tit 18, § 5108 (Purdon 1945).
2-Wis. STATS. § 359.12 (1953).
2 9 Dye v. Skeen, 135W. Va. 90, 62 S.E.2d 681 (1950).
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issue of prior convictions is tried along with the issue of guilt on the
present charge under such laws. It is said that this prejudices the
jury against the person so that it may find him guilty of the present
offense solely because of his past record. On the other band, some
prosecuting attorneys say that in some cases a jury, knowing that a
guilty verdict will result in a life sentence, will find a defendant
not guilty of the present offense regardless of the evidence because
of the harsh penalty involved.
Our court reversed a verdict in one case because the prosecutor
emphasized the prior convictions by introducing too much evidence
on that point.30
West Virginia's law was amended in 1943 so that the former
convictions are not alleged in the indictment and the habitual
criminal law does not enter the case until after conviction of the
present offense. This type procedure is fairer to all concerned and
the change was a desirable one.
Severity of West Virginia's Habitual Criminal Law and
Resultant Discrimination in its Application
While West Virginia's habitual criminal law compares with the
best in regard to the time when the prior convictions are brought
into the case, it does not do so in some other particulars.
Our law is one of the most severe of its kind in the country
today in that it makes it mandatory upon the court to impose a
life sentence in case of a third felony conviction regardless of the
type or seriousness of the present and prior convictions. Only
six other states impose life sentences upon a third felony convic-
tion,3' and in one of them such sentence is discretionary with the
court.3 2 Nineteen jurisdictions provide for life sentences in case
of a fourth felony conviction,33 and in four of them such sentence
is discretionary with the court.34 New York provides for a maxi-
mum of life upon a fourth conviction. Twenty-one jurisdictions do
not provide for a life sentence for any number of convictions and in
30 State v. Lawson, 125 W. Va. 1, 22 S.E.2d 643 (1942).
31 See note 16 supra.
32 Idaho.
33 See note 17 supra.
34 Delaware, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and South Dakota.
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nine of them the less than life additional penalty is discretionary with
the court.35
Thus, only five other jurisdictions have habitual criminal laws
as severe as West Virginia's. All others range from less severe to far
less severe.
As a result of our severe law one man was sent to our peniten-
tiary for life for the following crimes: First felony-breaking and
entering a dwelling house and stealing goods to the value of five
dollars. second felony-breaking and entering a dwelling house and
stealing goods to the value of $17.65. Third felony-forging a check
for five dollars. The first two convictions were for felonies com-
mitted when the convicted person was seventeen years of age.38
When I interviewed inmates of the penitentiary and studied their
records during the course of this study, I found others serving life
sentences for three relatively minor felonies.
Another result of the severity of our law is that most persons
who have been convicted of three or more felonies are not sentenced
to life in this state. In a report of a study of habitual criminal laws
in the United States which was made in 1949 it was stated that the
effect of West Virginia's law was nullified in practice.37 This is borne
out to a large extent by a study of the commitment records of West
Virginia Penitentiary made by an habitual lifer in that institution.
His study showed that over the period from 1940 to 1956 eleven
persons subject to be sentenced to life imprisonment under West
Virginia's habitual criminal law were not so sentenced to every
person who was so sentenced. The study showed that over that
period only 79 persons were sentenced to life under the law while
904 who could have been sentenced to life under it were not so
sentenced.
A few spot checks of the penitentiary records showed that the
maker of the study had missed several repeat offenders in his check
of the commitment records and that the discrimination was probably
35 Discretionary with the court: Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Virginia and Wisconsin.
30 See Dye v. Skeen, 135 W. Va. 90, 62 S.E.2d 681 (1950). The life
sentence in this case was held invalid by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia after ten years because the first two convictions were at one
term of court. The convicted person had to serve an additional five years
as a second offender.
3 7 Tappan, supra note 9.
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greater than his study indicated. I made my own study of the com-
mitment records of West Virginia Penitentiary for the years of 1937,
1938, 1947 and 1948. During those four years only twenty persons,
an average of five persons per year, were sentenced to life imprison-
ment under the habitual criminal law, and 364 persons subject to
being sentenced under that law were not so sentenced.
When the figures obtained during my study of the commitment
records are further broken down, the discrimination becomes more
obvious. Of the 20 persons who were sentenced to life imprisonment
under the law, ten had only two, nine had three and one had four
prior convictions. Of the 864 who could have been so sentenced,
but were not, 84 had three, 27 had four, eight had five, two had six
and three had seven prior convictions. All this in spite of the fact
that our habitual criminal law is mandatory in nature.
In regard to counties, one county did not commit a person to
the penitentiary under a life sentence as an habitual criminal during
those four years although 42 prisoners committed from that county
during that time had two or more prior convictions and so were
subject to life imprisonment under the law. Another county com-
mitted 27 prisoners during those four years who could have re-
ceived a life sentence under the law and only one of this group was
so sentenced. The ratio was one out of five in another county, one
out of six in another, one out of seven in another, one out of eight
in another, and three out of eight in another. Two counties com-
mitted one prisoner each who was subject to be sentenced to life im-
prisonment under the law during those four years and each of them
was so sentenced.
In view of these figures it is easy to see why the few prisoners
who have been sentenced to life imprisonment under our habitual
criminal law feel that they have been discriminated against. This
is one of the chief complaints against West Virginia's habitual crim-
inal law.
Of course, the reason the law was not imposed in many cases
was due to the fact that the person plead guilty to the present charge
in consideration of the law not being imposed. Bargain justice enters
the picture and the record doesn't show the whole picture insofar
as the part played by the habitual criminal law in our system of
criminal justice is concerned.
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West Virginia's law is not the only one which is virtually nulli-
fied in practice. Florida, North Dakota and Vermont have habitual
criminal laws which provide for a life sentence upon a fourth felony
conviction. In Florida and Vermont the law is mandatory and in
North Dakota it is discretionary. In an article on habitual criminal
laws, Paul W. Tappan stated,
"From other sources comes even more impressive evidence of
the disfavor in which the recidivist laws are held. Thus, Flor-
ida, where the law imposing a mandatory life sentence on the
fourth offender was described as fairly effective, shows only
two reported cases in 20 years where the penalty was applied.
North Dakota similarly reveals only two such cases and in Ver-
mont-from which no reply to the questionnaires and letters
was received-there have been no reported cases under its
statutes."38
A writer, commenting upon the Indiana law, which is like West
Virginia's in that it imposes a mandatory life sentence in case of a
third felony conviction, stated that although the law had been in
effect since 1907, it had seldom been invoked, convictions under it
having averaged only one a year.39
In response to a questionnaire sent during the course of this
study to the judges and prosecuting attorneys in West Virginia, the
group which administers the habitual criminal law, a majority of
those answering indicated that they did not believe that our law is
too severe. Ten answering judges did not believe the law to be too
severe and five believed it to be. Twenty-two prosecuting attorneys
did not believe the law to be too severe and twelve believed it to
be. Of the judges and prosecutors who indicated that they believed
the law to be too severe, all but one indicated that they believe that
this is the reason it is not imposed more often.
But a great majority of this group indicated that they believed
that the law should be changed. Only 16 out of the 59 who returned
completed questionnaires indicated that they believed that the
law should be retained as it is. Thirty-two believed that the impo-
sition of the life sentences provided in the act should be left to the
court's discretion and 20 believed that it should not be. Four of
the group favored making a life sentence mandatory in case of a
38 Id. at 29.
3 9 Note, 9 INn. L.J. 534 (1934), which cites a report of Indiana Com-
mittee on Observance and Enforcement of Law, Jan. 5, 1931.
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fourth felony conviction and six favored making a life sentence
discretionary in such case.
Nine of the group favored more leniency by making a life sen-
tence mandatory in case of a third conviction of certain enumerated
serious felonies and a similar number favored additional leniency
by making a life sentence discretionary in such case. Twelve favored
greater leniency by giving the court the discretion to sentence for life
in case of a third conviction of certain enumerated serious felonies,
and to add a certain number of years in case of a second felony con-
viction, a greater number of years in case of a third conviction of
felonies, all of which were not of the enumerated type, and so on.
Therefore, it seems that a great majority of this group is in favor
of a more lenient habitual criminal law. It seems further that the
majority believe that if the life sentence feature is retained, it should
only be imposed at the court's discretion, as it is in five jurisdictions,
or for certain enumerated serious felonies.
Making the law discretionary might not do any more than make
the present practice legal. It is hard to see where such a change
would change the situation insofar as discrimination is concerned.
As a practical matter the prosecuting attorneys get around the
harshness of the law in many cases by just refusing to file the re-
quired information except in cases where the additional sentence
seems merited. One prosecutor in a letter to me on the subject
stated,
"I have ignored the mandatory provisions and used my own
discretion as to when such information should be filed. It has
been my policy to pick out those cases where the prior con.
victions were for a wilful and malicious crime of a fairly serious
nature in filing informations under the Habitual Criminal Act."
Another prosecuting attorney suggested that the law should
be made discretionary so that the prosecutor's duty could be dis-
charged rather than overlooked.
Since our law is one of the most severe habitual criminal laws
in the United States perhaps some thought should be given to
making it more lenient. This could be done by making the law dis-
cretionary as suggested by several judges and prosecutors, but this
would probably not help the situation as far as discrimination in
sentencing is concerned. However, it should be noted that a change
from a mandatory life sentence upon a third felony conviction to
11
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a mandatory doubled sentence upon a second conviction and not
less than 15 years upon a third conviction did not materially aid
this situation in Kansas. As pointed out before, only 15.7% of those
subject to the more lenient law were sentenced under it over an
eight year period.40
The law could also be made more lenient by making a life
sentence mandatory upon a fourth conviction, or by making such
sentence discretionary in such case. The life sentence feature could
be eliminated altogether and additional years could be imposed in
case of subsequent convictions. If the life sentence is retained it
could be made mandatory or discretionary upon a third or fourth
conviction of certain enumerated serious felonies. Pennsylvania's
habitual criminal law makes a life sentence discretionary upon a
fourth conviction of certain enumerated felonies. It provides in part:
'WVhoever after having been convicted within or without this
Commonwealth of the crime, or attempt to commit the crime,
of treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, sodomy, buggery,
burglary, entering with intent to steal, robbery, arson, mayhem,
kidnapping, sale of narcotics, perjury, abortion, pandering, in-
cest, or any offense committed or attempted to be committed
through the instrumentality of or with the aid of a deadly
weapon or gunpowder or other explosive substance or corro-
sive fluid, may upon conviction of any of such crimes for a
second offense committed within five (5) years after the prior
offense, or subsequent offense committed within five (5) years
after the prior offense, be sentenced to imprisonment for a term,
the maximum of which shall not be more than twice the longest
term prescribed upon a first conviction of the crime in ques-
tion."41
The statute then provides for a discretionary life sentence upon
a fourth conviction of the enumerated crimes within five years of a
prior conviction. The list of enumerated crimes in the Pennsylvania
law is longer than in most states which enumerate the applicable
crimes, perhaps because of the time limit involved.
The recently enacted South Carolina statute lists only murder,
voluntary manslaughter, rape, armed robbery, highway robbery,
assault with intent to ravish, bank robbery, arson, burglary, or safe
40 This information was obtained in a letter from the Warden of Kansas
State Penitentiary.
41 PA. STATS. tit. 19, § 5108 (Purdon 1945).
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cracking as crimes which bring the habitual criminal law into opera-
tion.42
In considering the West Virginia habitual criminal law it is
easy to overlook the fact that in addition to the life sentence feature
it also contains a provision making it mandatory to sentence second
felony offenders to an additional five years. The harshness of the
life sentence on third conviction overshadows this lesser feature to
a very great extent. Like the life sentence, this additional penalty
is to be imposed regardless of the seriousness of the felonies involved.
A study of the commitment records at West Virginia Peniten-
tiary for the years 1937, 1938, 1947 and 1948 showed that the addi-
tional five year sentence was imposed in 145 cases and was not
imposed in 954 cases where it could have been imposed. In 51 cases
where it was imposed, it was imposed in lieu of a life sentence as
the prisoner had two or more prior convictions.
The figures for the years 1937 and 1938 are somewhat mislead-
ing. The definite type of sentence could be used at that time and
generally was used. The statute provides that the additional time
shall be imposed upon second offenders by adding five years to the
time for which the person is or would otherwise be sentenced if
the sentence is a definite sentence. If the sentence is indeterminate,
the five years shall be added to the maximum term provided by law
for the offense. So, in 1937 and 1938, the court, in imposing the
additional time, would often give the minimum sentence, usually
one year, as the definite sentence and then add the five years, mak-
ing a total of six years. Since there was usually over five years dif-
ference between the minimum and maximum sentences, the courts
often ignored the procedure of sentencing for second conviction and
imposed the maximum, or near the maximum, sentence. To illus-
trate, two persons, one a first offender and the other a second offender,
were sentenced in Nicholas County for breaking and entering on
November 18, 1937. The prescribed sentence for this offense is and
was not less than one nor more than ten years. 43 The court sen-
tenced the first offender to two and one-half years and the second
offender to eight years in prison. In Wood County, on September
10, 1937, a second offender was sentenced under the habitual crimi-
nal law to six years in prison for breaking and entering.
42 S.C. Acts 1955, No. 181.
43W. VA. CODE C. 61, art. 3, § 12 (Michie 1955).
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The records for 1937 and 1938 show a total of 78 cases where
repeat offenders were not procedurally sentenced as second offenders
but were probably given an extra five years because of former of-
fenses. Those records also indicate that repeat offenders were prob-
ably often given additional time because of prior offenses, but were
only given one, two or three additional years.
Since 1939, most sentences must be of the indeterminate type
and so if the additional penalty is imposed it must be imposed by
proving prior convictions and adding the additional five years to the
maximum sentence. Thus, it will necessarily show up in every case
where it is imposed if the sentence is of the indeterminate type.
The laws of 32 jurisdictions provide for an additional penalty
upon a second felony conviction. Twelve impose no additional pen-
alty until a third felony conviction. Several of them make the maxi-
mum sentence mandatory upon a second or third conviction.44 Oth-
ers, like West Virginia, make a certain number of additional years
mandatory in such case. Some make the additional years discre-
tionary.45
In Michigan, the court is given the discretion to impose a sen-
tence upon second offenders up to one and one-half the maximum
sentence prescribed for the present offense.46 Several others make
two times such maximum either mandatory or discretionary.47 Kan-
sas makes double the minimum and maximum mandatory on second
offense.48
Some of these laws are more severe than West Virginia's insofar
as second offenders are concerned. That is the case in those states
where twice the maximum sentence is mandatory upon a second
conviction. However, West Virginia's second offender law may be
too severe and this may be the reason why the additional penalty is
not meted out more often.
This feature of our law could be made less severe in several
ways. One way would be to make the law discretionary, but this
44 Mandatory on second conviction: Georgia, Illinois and Texas; mandatory
on third conviction: Massachusetts, Ohio and South Carolina.45 Maine and Wisconsin.
46 See note 7 supra.
47 Double the maximum mandatory: Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana and
New York; double the maximum discretionary: Connecticut, New Jersey,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and South Dakota.
48 KAN. STATs. c. 21, § 107a (1949).
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would not help matters insofar as discrimination is concerned.
Another way would be to make it mandatory that the court impose
an additional sentence of not less than one year nor more than five
years upon a second conviction. Thus, the court could take into
consideration the seriousness of the felonies involved. A third way
would be to make it mandatory for the court to increase both the
maximum and the minimum sentences not less than one nor more
than five years in such case where the prescribed sentence is of the
indeterminate type. In conjunction with the parole law requiring
that the minimum sentence be served before a person is eligible for
parole, this type additional sentence seems fair. If the sentence is
of the definite type, as a few still are, the law should make it manda-
tory for the court to add not less than one nor more than five years to
the sentence which would otherwise be imposed. The present parole
law requires that one-third of a definite sentence be served before
a person is eligible for parole. This parole eligibility law could be
amended so as to make first offenders serving definite sentences serve
one-fourth, second offenders one-third, and third and subsequent
offenders one-half of such sentences before they would be eligible
for parole.
There is, perhaps, a practical reason why the habitual criminal
law should be less severe. As stated above, a study of the com-
mitment records at West Virginia Penitentiary for the years 1937,
1938, 1947 and 1948 showed that only one out of 19 persons were
sentenced to prison for life upon three or more felony convictions.
A great majority of the 18 out of 19 persons with three or more
convictions who were not so sentenced received an indeterminate
sentence of one to ten years and were eligible for parole at the end of
one year. While the records for the above referred to years indicate
that very few prisoners with three or more convictions who received
a one to ten year sentence were paroled, they were finally discharged
within five to ten years depending upon the good time earned.
If these years are average years then only one out of 19 persons
subject to life imprisonment under the habitual criminal law receive
such sentence. If all persons subject to the law were sentenced
to life imprisonment they would have to be kept in prison for life
unless sooner paroled (excluding pardon and commutation of sen-
tence which rarely occur). They would almost all serve far longer
terms than they have been serving; they would not even be eligible
for parole until they have served 15 years, and not too many of them
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would be paroled until later than that, if at all. Thus, the present
overcrowded condition of our penitentiary would become progres-
sively worse.
In the Kansas study referred to above it was estimated that if
the law were applied in every applicable case the prison population
in the state would be doubled in ten years.49
Repeal
Several writers on the subject of habitual criminal laws have
advocated outright repeal of these laws on the ground that they have
failed to achieve their purpose and have had harmful results. But,
instead of repealing their existing laws in this field, most states
which have made any change merely make their laws less severe.
Others, Delaware and South Carolina, which had no habitual crim-
inal laws, have recently enacted such laws as has been pointed out
earlier in this report.
In replies to the questionnaire on the subject sent to the judges
and prosecuting attorneys in West Virginia only two prosecuting
attorneys indicated that they favor repeal of West Virginia's law,
and they also indicated that they favored a more lenient law. They
may have meant that they favored a repeal of the existing law and
the enactment of a new and more lenient law.
West Virginias habitual criminal law has largely failed to
achieve its purpose if its purpose is to put a severe penalty upon
third felony offenders and to rid society of such offenders for a long
period of time. Available figures show that it is seldom imposed
in applicable cases. It may often be used as a weapon to obtain
guilty pleas to present indictments, but this is certainly not its
purpose.
Our law has resulted in discrimination and consequent dissatis-
faction and unrest among the few upon whom the life sentence has
been imposed. Prisoners sentenced under the law complain of the
discrimination even more than they do of the severity of the law.
Prison officials interviewed during the course of the study said that
the law as presently administered is worse than no habitual crimi-
nal law.
4 9 Note, 48 COL. L. REv. 288, 252 n.121 (1948).
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As shown earlier in this report a more lenient law did not re-
sult in the achievement of the purpose of such laws in Kansas.
However, the experience of one state may not be indicative of
the experience of the majority of the states which have made their
laws less severe.
As is also shown earlier in this report, most of the judges and
prosecutors who indicated on the questionnaire that they thought
our law too severe thought that it would be imposed oftener if it
were less severe.
All six of the prisoners sentenced to life under our habitual
criminal law whom I interviewed at the penitentiary indicated that
they believed that the law should provide some additional penalty
for habitual offenders, but not such a severe penalty. They all also
stated that they believed that all or none subject to the law should
receive the additional sentence.
The answer to the problem in West Virginia, at least at the
present time, does not seem to be a repeal of the law, but to amend
the law so that it will more nearly achieve its purpose.
Procedure
Another reason that our habitual criminal law is not invoked
more often is that the procedure of proving prior convictions is too
difficult, and many prosecuting attorneys are inclined to forego
the filing of the information for this reason. Several prosecutors, in
letters, and in comments written upon the questionnaires which they
returned to me, stated that they favored an easier method of proving
prior convictions. The following comment is quoted from a letter
from a prosecuting attorney:
"As to the Habitual Criminal Law, I concede that the necessity
of producing the several fingerprint records of a defendant for
the purpose of identifying him as a defendant in a prior felony
and of vouching those records by the proper witnesses fre-
quently presents a considerable expense, time expenditure, and
practical difficulty which make the average West Virginia prose-
cuting attorney inclined to forego the whole matter, particularly
when the prior offenses are committed outside the State of West
Virginia."
Another prosecuting attorney cited a case where, after a verdict
of guilty was brought in by the jury, the jury panel was discharged
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for the term before he had time to file an information charging
previous convictions against the person found guilty.
In answering the questionnaire 23 prosecutors indicated that
they thought that the habitual criminal law would be invoked oftener
if an easier method of proving prior convictions were provided by
statute, and 12 indicated that they did not think it would be. I be-
lieve that if they had been asked if they were in favor of providing
an easier method of proving prior convictions by statute the affirma-
tive replies would have been much greater in number.
Our statute now provides that if the person presently convicted
stands silent, or pleads not guilty, when asked if he is the same
person who was convicted of the previous felonies alleged in the
information, a jury be impaneled to try the issue of identity. While
the issue is one of fact, it has nothing to do with the guilt or inno-
cence of the convicted person. It simply deals with the sentence
which the court is to impose in the case and so could, and probably
should be tried by the court and not a jury.
There are really two issues involved in the proof that a person
is subject to the habitual criminal law. One is the issue of whether
there has been a prior conviction, and the other is whether the
person presently convicted is the person who was previously con-
victed. The first issue does not cause the court nearly as much
trouble as the second. They are generally spoken of as if they are
one issue.
The laws of six states, Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska,
South Carolina and Vermont, provide that the question of prior con-
victions in habitual criminal cases be tried by the court. Wisconsin
law provides that the issue shall be tried by a jury if demanded,
otherwise it shall be tried by the court.50 All other laws, including
West Virginia's, require a jury trial on that question.
In addition to the states providing for a determination of the
issue of prior convictions by the court the American Law Institutes
Model Penal Code, drawn up in 1954, provides that the court shall
determine this issue.5 ' This was also true of the Institutes Model
Code of Criminal Procedure, drawn up in 1931.
55 Wis. STATs. § 359.12 (1958).
51 MoDEr PEu CODE § 7.03 (Ten. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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There is a split of authority on the question of whether a
statute giving the court the power to try the issue of prior con-
victions is constitutional. 52  But the later cases generally take the
position that no constitutional right is involved,53 even though most
of them arose in states having constitutional guarantees of jury trial
in criminal cases similar to West Virginia's.
In a Louisiana case the court stated in the syllabus that
"Act No. 15 of 1928, providing for increased punishment for
second and subsequent offenders, does not require that pro-
ceeding to so punish be tried by a jury, since, though the ques-
tions involved are purely questions of fact, they do not relate
to the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant."5 4
Article III, section 14 of the constitution of West Virginia
provides that trials of crimes shall be by a jury of twelve men. But,
as our court has indicated, the person alleged to have been previously
convicted is no longer accused, he is convicted, and the question of
guilt is no longer an open question. It is just a question of what
sentence authorized by the legislature shall be imposed. 5  The
Kansas constitution that in all prosecutions the accused shall be
allowed a trial by an impartial jury,56 and the Nebraska constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to trial by an impartial jury.5 In both these states the courts
52 An old annotation in 58 A.L.R. 20, 59 (1929) states that a charge of
prior conviction is an essential element of the offense charged and the de-
fendant is entitled to a jury trial on the issue. A later annotation in 82 A.L.R.
365 (1933) says this is the old rule, but cites Louisiana cases for a contrary
view. In 25 Am. Jun., Habitual Criminals § 83 (1940), it is stated that
the question of prior convictions is generally held to be an issue of fact to be
determined by a jury. This is true in most cases because the statute, like
West Virginia's, requires that the issue be so determined.
53 See State v. Hardy, 174 La. 458, 141 So. 27 (1932); Levell v. Simpson,
142 Kan. 892, 52 P.2d 372, appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 695 (1935), for lack
of a substantial federal question; Glover v. Simpson, 144 Kan. 153, 58 P.2d
73, appeal dismissed, 299 U.S. 506 (1936), for lack of a substantial federal
question; Haffke v. State, 149 Neb. 83, 30 N.W.2d 462 (1948). But see State
v. Furth, 5 Wn.2d 7, 104 P.2d 925 (1940), where the court stated that even
though the statute did not require it, the issue must be determined by a jury
under the Washington constitution which guarantees a right to jury trial where
a person is charged with the commission of an offense. (Most states, including
West Virginia, as is later pointed out, take the view that in such case a person
is not charged with the commission of an offense.)
54 State v. Guidry, 169 La. 215, 124 So. 832 (1929). In Levell v.
Simpson, supra note 53, the court stated, "In this state it is no concern of thejury what the penalty for a crime may be.
55 See State v. Graham, supra note 13.
5 6 KAN. CONsT., Bill of Rights, § 10.
5 T See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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have held that these provisions do not entitle one to a jury trial on
the issue of prior convictions under their habitual criminal laws.58
In two Kansas cases, the United States Supreme Court has, in effect,
upheld such holding by dismissing appeals on the ground that there
was no substantial federal question involved,59 and such would not
have been the case if the appellants had been denied due process
of law as set out in the constitution of their state.
The West Virginia case of Graham v. West Virginia 0 was af-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court. In that case our su-
preme court stated,
"Since the mere imposing of the additional sentence warranted
by law is not a holding to answer for crime, is not a second
jeopardy or punishment for the offense itself to which the sen-
tence rightfully belongs, and is clearly due process of law, what
constitutional limitation has been placed upon legislation in
this particular? None."61 (Emphasis supplied.)
Our court further stated in that case that,
"By these proceedings he is not held to answer for an offense.
He is not made to defend against a charge of crime. He is no
wise called upon to answer in relation to alleged crime. No
allegation of crime is in the information. It alleges only his
status as a convict. It alleges that he has been held to answer for
crime and that he stands convicted of it through the indictment
of a grand jury. It points him out as a convict already held,
upon whom rests the general sentence of the law of life im-
prisonment . . . The proceedings under the statute are for
identification only. They are clearly not for the establishment
of guilt. The question of guilt is not reopened."62
Our court also quoted a Massachusetts case in the Graham case
when it stated that,
"This is not an information of an offense for which a trial is to
be had, but of a fact, namely, that the prisoner has already
been convicted of an offense; and this fact must appear, either
by his own confession, or by the verdict of a jury or otherwise
5 Levell v. Simpson, 142 Kan. 892, 52 P.2d 372, appeal dismissed, 297
U.S. 695 (1935), for lack of a substantial federal question, and Haffke v. State,
149 Neb. 88, 80 N.W.2d 462 (1948).
59 See Levell v. Simpson, and Glover v. Simpson, both supra note 53.
60 68 W. Va. 248, 69 S.E. 1010, 224 U.S. 616 (1910).
61 68 W. Va. at 253, 69 S.E. at 1011.
62 68 W. Va. at 251, 69 S.E. at 1011.
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according to law, before he can be sentenced to the additional
punishment." 3  (Emphasis supplied.)
The last two quotations were also quoted by the United States
Supreme Court upon appeal to that Court. 4
In view of this it seems that the court could determine the issue
of prior convictions in West Virginia without any constitutional bar
if the legislature gave it such power.
A further step in simplifying the procedure of proving prior
convictions alleged against a person presently convicted would be
to make the proof of such allegations easier. This could be done by
making properly authenticated copies of records of court proceed-
ings and commitment records of penitentiaries of this and other
states prima facie proof that there were such convictions as is the
case in some states.65
The proof that the person presently convicted is the same
person as the one previously convicted would be made easier by
making admissible in evidence an authenticated certification of
the officer in charge of the criminal identification bureau of the
West Virginia Department of Public Safety to the effect that he had
received attached authenticated copies of fingerprints of the person
previously convicted from the person, in or out of this state, in whose
lawful custody the originals were kept, that he had received copies
of the fingerprints of the person presently convicted from a member
of said Department of Public Safety, and that he had compared
both copies and found them to be copies of the fingerprints of one
and the same person.
These procedures would make it much easier and far less ex-
pensive to prove the prior conviction and that the person presently
convicted is the person who was previously convicted. It would
63 68 W. Va. at 253, 69 S.E. at 1012.
64 The first of the two quotations appears in 224 U.S. at 628, and the
second in 224 U.S. at 628. This case is cited in an annotation in 85 A.L.R.
1099, 1106 (1933), and in 25 Am. Ju., Habitual Criminals, § 33 (1940), for
the proposition that the issue of identity must be determined by a fury. These
conclusions were reached by taking a sentence of the opinion out of its context.
The court really stated that under the West Virginia statute the issue had to be
determined by a jury, which is true, of course.
65 E.g., IowA CODE § 747.3 (1954). ALAsA CoMP. LAWS C. 66, art.
21, § 2 (1949), provides that properly authenticated court records showing a
conviction shall be conclusive evidence that there was such a conviction and
that the person named therein was convicted.
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seem that in such case prosecuting attorneys would be more willing
to file informations, especially in cases where the prior convictions
were in another county or in another state.
These two changes, if made, would probably be objected to
on the ground that they violate our constitutional provision which
provides that the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses
against him.6G
This, too, could be met with the argument that this is not a trial
inquiring into the guilt or innocence of an accused person, but simply
a proceeding to determine what punishment should be meted out
to a person convicted of a crime. Most of the court decision up-
holding the right of the court and not the jury to determine the issue
of prior convictions would be applicable in determining the validity
of a procedure of this type.
However, I have not been able to find any jurisdiction which
has a procedure for proving prior convictions such as the last pro-
cedure outlined above.
Some jurisdictions have attempted to cope with discrimination
in filing informations by making it the duty of the prosecuting at-
torney to file such information when he learns of former convic-
tions even though the person may be in prison serving his sentence.
They have statutes providing that the additional sentence can be
imposed at any time after conviction or sentence. They further
provide that whenever it shall become known to any warden or
prison, probation, parole or police officer, or other peace officer, that
a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of a
felony or felonies, it shall become his duty to report the facts to the
prosecuting attorney of the county where the person was last con-
victed. The statutes further provide that in such case it shall be
the duty of such prosecuting attorney to file an information, and
then the court in which the last conviction was had shall have said
person, whether confined in prison or otherwise, brought before it
to determine if he has been previously convicted, and if it is found
that he has been, the court shall sentence him under the habitual
criminal law, after vacating any prior sentence. New York, Michi-
gan and several other jurisdictions have such statutes.67
66 W. VA. CoNs-r. art. II, § 14.
67N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1943 (Supp. 1956); MiCH. Com. LAws §§
169.10-12 (1948).
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Such statutes should go a long way toward eliminating the dis-
crimination found in the application of habitual criminal laws. There
is an express duty upon persons, some of whom are bound to know
or learn of any prior convictions, to inform the prosecutor of such
convictions, and an express duty on the part of the prosecutor to
apply the habitual criminal law when such knowledge is conveyed
to him.
West Virginia has no such provisions in its habitual criminal
law, but a separate statute, Code 62-8-4, provides a procedure
whereby the warden of West Virginia Penitentiary may file infor-
mation of prior convictions against convicts in the penitentiary in
the Circuit Court of Marshall County in cases where the information
was not filed by the prosecuting attorney. The statute further pro-
vides that that court shall sentence such convicts under the habitual
criminal law if they are found to have been previously convicted.
But this statute makes the filing of such information discre-
tionary with the warden and a study of the records at the peniten-
tiary shows that no such information has been filed by the warden
since the statute was made discretionary in 1951. Prior to that time
the statute was mandatory, but only one or two informations were
filed under it during a ten year period prior to 1951 although there
were hundreds of convicts in the penitentiary during that time sub-
ject to having such information filed against them. The present
warden and the immediate past warden, to both of whom I talked
during this study, feel the statute imposes too great a burden upon
them and the Circuit Court of Marshall County inasmuch as there
are probably an average of 371 prisoners per year committeed to the
penitentiary who have one or more former convictions without an
additional sentence for that reason if the commitment records for
the years 1937, 1938, 1947, and 1948 were average years.
As a practical matter this statute is entirely ineffective and might
as well be repealed. A statute requiring the prosecuting attorney
to have them brought back to the sending county for sentence when
he is notified of former convictions would probably be far more effec-
tive. Two prosecuting attorneys, in letters to me, suggested such
a procedure.
Our present law makes it the duty of the prosecutor to file the
information after conviction and before sentence when he has
knowledge of former convictions. Thus, if he has no knowledge of
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prior convictions, or if he acquires such knowledge after sentence,
there is no duty on his part to act. Our law then leaves it up to the
warden to act under Code 62-8-4, and as has been shown, he does
not act as a practical matter. Under the law of New York and other
jurisdictions as described above, the prosecutor is almost bound to
learn of prior convictions if there are such and the information can
be filed by him at any time prior to the expiration of the sentence.
In response to the questionnaire on the habitual criminal law
19 judges indicated that they believed that it should be the duty of
the prosecuting attorney to ascertain the prior criminal record of
every person convicted of a felony in his county and file an infor-
mation alleging prior convictions when it is ascertained that such
person has been previously convicted, and only one judge indicated
that he did not believe the prosecuting attorneys should have this
duty. Nineteen prosecutors were in favor of their having such a
duty and 18 were opposed to it. The group as a whole was two to
one in favor of imposing this duty upon the prosecuting attorney.
Habitual Criminal Laws and
Probation and Parole
Probation and parole laws cut across habitual criminal laws to
a certain extent. As has been said, one of the purposes of habitual
criminal laws is to rid society of repeat offenders for a greater length
of time. Where repeat offenders can be released on probation or
parol, this purpose is defeated to a certain extent, but rehabilitation
of prisoners is aided. Where the habitual criminal laws are very
severe, as in West Virginia, parole helps the situation to some extent.
In 16 states and the District of Columbia, probation is denied
habitual offenders; most of such jurisdictions bar probation upon a
second conviction of a felony, as does West Virginia.68 So, in West
Virginia, and other jurisdictions with similar laws, habitual offenders
are not eligible for probation and the court must sentence them to
prison where they must be kept until released on parole or dis-
charged at the expiration of their sentences.
The laws of several jurisdictions bar parole for habitual offend-
ers.69 In fact, the habitual criminal law of Tennessee bars parole
M W. VA. CODE C. 62, art. 12, § 2 (Michie 1955).
09 See laws of Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon
and Tennessee.
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and commutation of sentence, but not pardon, to persons sentenced
to life as habitual criminals. 70
The majority of jurisdictions having habitual criminal laws al-
low parole, some without regard to prior offenses, but others pro-
vide that persons with a certain number of prior convictions cannot
be paroled until they have served their minimum sentence or some
certain number of years. The jurisdictions which allow parole with-
out regard to prior offenses leave it up to the paroling authority to
consider this feature of the individual case.
Parole for habitual criminals is nowhere specifically mentioned
in West Virginia laws. Prisoners in the penitentiary with two prior
convictions are not eligible for parole until they have served their
minimum sentence in West Virginia, but this is also true in the case
of first and second offenders.71 No person sentenced for life may be
paroled until he has served 10 years, or 15 years if he has twice
previously been convicted of felonies.72
Thus, it appears that the persons in West Virginia who have
been among the select few to have the life sentence imposed upon
them for a third conviction are not eligible for parole until they have
served 15 years. Third, fourth, or even seventh offenders who es-
caped such penalty at the hands of the court are eligible for parole
at the expiration of the minimum of their indeterminate sentence,
which is often one year, or at the expiration of one-third of their
definite sentence. In such case, the two prior convictions hit the
habitual lifers twice; once in causing the life sentence to be imposed
upon them and again by delaying their eligibility for parole for sev-
eral years.
The Committee on the Standard Probation and Parole Act of
the National Probation and Parole Association take the view that
there should be no restrictions on the parole boards' discretion in
the consideration of habitual criminals for parole and oppose restric-
tions such as those in West Virginia's law.73
It does seem that our parole law should be somewhat more
uniform in the treatment of repeat offenders. As it is, all are treated
70 TENN. CODE §§ 11863.2 & 3 (Williams, Supp. 1952).
71W. VA. CODE c. 62, art. 12, § 12 (Michie 1955).
72 Ibid.
73 NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE AsS'N, STANDARD PROBATION AND
PARoLE ACr, comment on § 18 (1955).
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the same as first offenders except those sentenced to life imprison-
ment. A prisoner who happens to be one of the one out of 19 per-
sons with three or more convictions who has been sentenced to
life imprisonment for that reason may only have been convicted
of three relatively minor felonies. Such a person sees other prison-
ers with as many as seven convictions not so sentenced become
eligible for parole after having served but one year, while he does
not become eligible until he has served 15 years. He also sees pris-
oners sentenced to five to 18 years for second degree murder, some
with prior convictions, become eligible for parole after five years;
and others sentenced to life for first degree murder, some with a
prior conviction, become eligible for parole after ten years.
However, it should be pointed out that the penitentiary release
records for 1987, 1938, 1947 and 1948 show that few prisoners com-
mitted during those years with two or more prior convictions were
released on parole. Six of the 20 who were committed during those
years with a life sentence under the habitual criminal law have
been paroled after serving over 15 years. Others of this group
committed during 1947 and 1948 are not yet eligible for parole.
Twenty-seven prisoners with two or more prior convictions out
of the 864 such prisoners committed during those years under less
than life sentences were paroled. But most of these were paroled
after serving a substantial part of their sentence, so that they would
have been eligible for unconditional discharge within a short time
if they had not been paroled. Very little could be lost by paroling
them at that time as they could be returned to finish out their terms
without credit for the time on parole if they violated the conditions
of their parole.74
74 See Watts v. Skeen, 182 W. Va. 787, 54 S.E.2d 568 (1949), where the
court held that parole suspends the sentence so that time served on parole does
not count as served on the prison sentence.
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